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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
The plaintiffs' brief is like a ship passing in the night. 
It never touches the principal arguments raised in the defendants' 
brief because it begs the central questions in this action— 
namely, whether Froerer Corp. assumed Ranch Liquidators' 
obligations under the Purchase Agreement and whether the deed 
from Ranch Liquidators conveyed clear title to Froerer Corp. or 
was meant only as security. The plaintiffs continue to proceed 
under the false premise that Froerer Corp. somehow purchased 
the Property from and assumed the obligations of Ranch 
Liquidators of Utah, Inc. when the Purchase Agreement was assigned 
to Froerer Corp. on June 11, 1980. The only theory presented 
in plaintiffs' brief to support the trial court's conclusion— 
that defendants are liable to plaintiffs—is that Froerer Corp. 
bought the Property from Ranch Liquidators with the knowledge 
of plaintiffs' interest in the Property and, therefore, took 
the Property impressed with an equitable trust. However, as 
already demonstrated in defendant's brief, there is no factual 
or legal support for plaintiffs' position or the trial court's 
entry of summary judgment. Notwithstanding the trial court's 
ruling that "the facts are undisputed and the decision turns 
on the legal effect of the docum[e]nt of contract and conveyance," 
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genuine issues of material fact exist, and, as a matter of law, 
plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment. 
In this Reply Brief, defendants will demonstrate that the 
trial court's summary judgment was erroneous and, in critical 
respects, unsupported or directly controverted by competent 
evidence from an otherwise limited record. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Throughout their initial brief, defendants contended that 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs because there were several genuine issues of material 
fact still left to be resolved. The plaintiffs present, at pages 
1-3 of their brief, their version of the facts. Their argument 
follows logically (if not coherently) from their version of the 
facts, but the argument begs the central questions in this appeal 
by assuming, without any unambiguous evidence to support them, 
the very facts that the defendants have disputed. 
Apart from the inaccurate citations to the Addendum1 
the defendants do not dispute paragraphs 1 through 3 of the 
plaintiffs' statement of facts. 
1
 The plaintiffs' brief is confusing in part because of 
their inaccurate citation to the Addendum. The documents 
plaintiffs cite to in their brief do not accurately correspond 
to the lettered Addendum. 
- 2 -
In response to paragraph 4, the defendants do not 
dispute that Ranch Liquidators received $80,000 from Froerer 
Corp. for an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' right to receive 
future contract payments and that the 23 contract receivables 
had a total principal balance of about $149,000. Moreover, they 
do not dispute that Fred Froerer acquired a commitment for title 
insurance (Addendum "B" to plaintiffs' brief), but deny that 
Froerer felt that it indicated title in them. The commitment 
shows title in Louis B. and Lillian C. Ellsworth as trustees of 
the Louis B. Ellsworth and Lillian C. Ellsworth Trust, and 
Fredrick Froerer III (Fred Froerer's son) testified that he could 
not say what the corporation (Froerer Corp.) thought or knew 
about title to the Property. Deposition of Frederick Froerer 
III at 12. He also testified that his understanding was that 
title to the Property was in Basin Land & Title, as trustee under 
the purchase agreement between Ranch Liquidators of Utah and 
the Ellsworths as sellers. Id. at 13-14.2 Although there is 
no evidence that Fred Froerer actually obtained title insurance, 
it would not be inconsistent with the defendants' position if 
he did. The defendants do not contend that they had no interest 
in the Property. They contend that they had a security interest 
2 Although Mr. Froerer said that at the time of the 
commitment Mwe are in title," Deposition of Fredrick Froerer 
III at 11, this appears to be a slip of the tongue because the 
preceding sentence indicates that the Ellsworths were in title, 
as shown by the commitment. 
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in the Property, in other words, a mortgage, and it is common 
practice for a lender-mortgagee to obtain title insurance to 
protect its security interest in land. 
The defendants do not dispute paragraphs 5 and 6 of 
the plaintiffs' statements of facts. However, the fact that 
Froerer Corp. executed and recorded a Notice of Assignment of 
Contracts at worst is neutral and at best supports the defendants' 
factual theory, not the plaintiffs'. The notice is neutral in 
that it does not say what Froerer Corp. 's interest in the Property 
is. The notice is as consistent with a claimed security interest 
as it is with any alleged fee interest. In fact, the notice 
states that Froerer Corp. claims an interest in the Property 
"by virtue of certain Assignments of Real Estate Contracts," 
not by virtue of any deed, suggesting that Froerer Corp.'s 
interest in the Property was as security for the assignments and 
not any fee interest. If Froerer Corp. had claimed a fee interest 
in the Property, it would have recorded the Warranty Deed, which 
would have been much simpler than creating a new document, and 
not a Notice of Assignment of Contracts. Froerer Corp. never 
did record the Warranty Deed. Clearly, the Notice of Assignment 
of Contracts was meant to show those dealing with the Property 
that Froerer Corp. — not Ranch Liquidators — had the right to 
receive payments under the real estate contracts. It was not 
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intended as notice of any fee interest in the Property since 
Froerer Corp. did not have such an interest. 
In response to paragraph 7, the defendants do not dis-
pute that they received the Winegars' payments from June 1980 
until the contract was paid in full. However, Ranch Liquidators 
received the Winegars' payments for the previous eleven months. 
Moreover, Froerer Corp. did not record the Warranty Deed or the 
Quit-Claim Deed. The Warranty Deed and Quit-Claim Deed show 
that they were both recorded at the request of "A. Wayne Winegar." 
See Brief of Respondents, Addenda "E" and "I"; Deposition of 
Frederick Froerer, III, p. 36. Froerer Corp. also strongly dis-
putes that it ever had an obligation to convey clear title to 
the plaintiffs. (See Appellants Brief, pp. 5-6.) 
Finally, at paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts, 
plaintiffs highlight the central issue involved in this case, 
namely, whether or not Froerer Corp. intended to assume Ranch 
Liquidators' obligations under the Purchase Agreement. The 
defendants maintain that Froerer Corp. never intended to assume 
any of Ranch Liquidators' obligations. Because intent is a 
question of fact, the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in plaintiffs' favor. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ONLY ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IF THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACTS AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOWED 
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that this Court does not have to 
accord any deference to the trial court's conclusions concerning 
whether the material facts are in dispute. Nor do the plaintiffs 
dispute that this Court must view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Contrary to the plaintiffs' 
assertion—that the documents unambiguously obligated defendants 
to convey title to the Property and that the defendants' failure 
to do so entitles plaintiffs to rescission of the Purchase 
Agreement—the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because, under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendants, the defendants never purchased the Property or 
became obligated to convey title to plaintiffs. 
II. THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR BREACH 
OF CONTRACT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT A PARTY 
TO THE PURCHASE CONTRACT, AND THEY DID NOT 
ASSUME RANCH LIQUIDATORS' LIABILITIES UNDER 
THE PURCHASE CONTRACT. 
The central issues of this case focus upon the Court's inter-
pretation of the Assignment, whereby Ranch Liquidators assigned 
the Purchase Contract to Froerer Corp. The first issue is whether 
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Froerer Corp. assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligation to convey 
title in the Property to plaintiffs under the Purchase Agreement. 
If the parties intended Froerer Corp. to assume Ranch Liquidators' 
obligation, then the defendants may have had an obligation to 
convey title to the plaintiffs. On the other hand, if the par-
ties did not intend defendants to assume Ranch Liquidators' ob-
ligations, then there was no obligation to convey the Property 
to plaintiffs. The parties' intent, however, is a question of 
fact. 
The second issue is whether the Assignment and the 
contemporaneous delivery of the Warranty Deed to Froerer Corp. 
constituted a purchase of the Property, thereby creating a trust 
in favor of the plaintiffs. In other words, was the deed meant 
as a conveyance or a mortgage? Again, if the parties intended 
the deed to be a present conveyance of fee title, then defendants 
may have had an obligation to convey title. In contrast, if 
the deed was meant as a mortgage, then no such obligation arose.3 
The plaintiffs confuse these two issues by simply arguing 
in Points I-IV of their brief that the Assignment was a purchase 
of the Property and, therefore, an assumption of Ranch Liquida-
tors' obligations. The law, however, does not impose such li-
ability upon an assignee unless expressly stated in the contract. 
Defendants address the second issue in Point IV, infra. 
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Froerer Corp. never assumed Ranch Liquidators' liability, 
but only took an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' right to future 
payments under the Purchase Agreement, i.e., Ranch Liquidators' 
contract receivables. The Assignment is devoid of any language 
which implies an assumption of Ranch Liquidators' liabilities. 
Cf. Murr v. Selaa Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 1302, 1309 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1987); see also Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, Inc. 682 P.2d 
723, 725 (Mont. 1984) (assignee's assumption of liability must 
be clearly shown); Treasure Valley Bank v. Long, 92 Or. App. 
598, 759 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1988) (assignee did not assume assig-
nor's obligation because assignment did not contain any language 
to the effect that assignee agreed to assume or not assume ob-
ligations) . 
Moreover, the Assignment provides that Froerer Corp. accepted 
it "subject to" the covenants and conditions contained in the 
Purchase Agreement. (Record at 44.) "A purchaser taking realty 
subject to an encumbrance 'does not necessarily assume a personal 
obligation to pay it'". Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Smith, 
21 Ariz. App. 371, 519 P.2d 860, 863 (1974); see also, S.L. 
Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 146 
S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966) (assignment must clearly show an intent 
to assume the assignor's liability). Because the Assignment 
does not contain any assumption language, the responsibility of 
conveying clear title to plaintiffs remains the obligation of 
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Ranch Liquidators* Therefore, defendants cannot, as a matter 
of law, be held liable for Ranch Liquidators' failure to convey, 
and the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for 
summary j udgment• 
III. IF THE ASSIGNMENT WAS AMBIGUOUS, EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE PARTIES 
INTENT. 
Interestingly, plaintiffs do not dispute that absent an 
express assumption of liability, an assignment of a contract 
does not impose on the assignee the assignor's duties or 
liabilities under the contract. (See Brief of Respondents, p. 
12.) Despite the absence of an express assumption of liability, 
plaintiffs contend that by the Assignment the parties clearly and 
unambiguously intended that Froerer Corp. would assume Ranch 
Liquidators' obligations. Plaintiffs, however, fail to refer 
this court to any direct or circumstantial evidence in the record 
to support this assertion. Thus, at the very least there exists 
a disputed issue of material fact concerning what the parties 
intended by the Assignment. 
The only extrinsic evidence before the trial court was the 
Affidavit of Frederick Froerer, III, which supported the con-
clusion that Froerer Corp. never intended to assume Ranch Liqui-
dators' obligations. (See Affidavit of Frederick Froerer, III; 
Record at 73-74.) The trial court was required to draw all rea-
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sonable inferences in favor of defendants, see Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P. 2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982), and its failure to draw 
such an inference in this case was error. 
IV. FROERER CORP. DID NOT BUY THE PROPERTY FROM 
RANCH LIQUIDATORS AND THEREFORE HAD NO OBLI-
GATION TO CONVEY. 
As noted above, the only argument plaintiffs proffer in 
support of the trial court's summary judgment is that the de-
fendants purchased the Property from Ranch Liquidators with 
knowledge of the plaintiffs' interest in the Property, thereby 
imposing a trust in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs 
justify the trial court's decision by asserting that Ranch 
Liquidators' delivery of, and Froerer Corp.'s subsequent recording 
of the Warranty Deed,4 manifested an intention to convey title 
to Froerer Corp.^ 
4
 Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that the Warranty Deed 
and Quit-Claim Deed were recorded by Froerer Corp. A simple 
review of the documents, Addendum "E" and "I" to plaintiffs' 
brief, reveals they were recorded at the request of "A. Wayne 
Winegar", a plaintiff in this action. See also Deposition of 
Frederick Froerer, III, pp. 18, 36. 
5 Plaintiffs state that "[t]here is absolutely no evidence 
that Ranch Liquidators intended anything other than to deed abso-
lute title to Froerer." (Brief of Respondents, p. 15). In fact, 
there is no evidence one way or the other of Ranch Liquidators' 
intent, but the evidence of Froerer Corp.'s intent, including 
the testimony of Fredrick Froerer III and the fact that Froerer 
Corp. did not record the deed, shows that Froerer Corp. did not 
accept the deed as a conveyance of "absolute title." 
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Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, Froerer Corp. did not 
purchase the Property from Ranch Liquidators, thereby imposing 
an equitable trust in plaintiffs' favor. What Froerer Corp. 
purchased was the right to receive contract payments, i.e., ac-
count receivables. The Warranty Deed was given to Froerer Corp. 
as security for its future right to receive the payments.6 More-
over, the Warranty Deed was delivered to Froerer Corp. contem-
poraneously with the Assignment. (See Addenda "D" and "E" to 
plaintiffs' brief.) Plaintiffs would have this Court believe 
that such a delivery showed an intent on the part of Ranch Liqui-
dators to convey title. However, the mere giving of a warranty 
deed is not dispositive of the parties' intent. When a warranty 
deed is given contemporaneously with a written agreement between 
the parties, the transaction may be a mortgage if that was the 
parties' intent. Bvbee v. Stewart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 
122 (1948); see also Kiar v. Brimlev, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 
23, 25-26 (1972) (a mortgage may consist of a warranty deed and 
a separate contract in writing). In an equitable action such 
as this, in which the plaintiffs sought and were awarded 
rescission, parol evidence is admissible to show the intent of 
6 Throughout his deposition, Frederick Froerer, III 
testified that it had been his understanding that Froerer Corp. 
was acquiring nothing more than Ranch Liquidator's contract 
receivables. (Froerer Depo., pp. 7-9, 25-26, 30, 35, 37.) He 
further testified that "it was my understanding that the [Warranty 
Deed] was for the purpose of being used in the event of default." 
(Froerer Depo., p. 28.) 
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the parties to a deed absolute on its face. Bybee, 189 P.2d at 
122. There is simply no evidence of Ranch Liquidators' intent, 
and all the evidence of Froerer Corp.'s intent shows that the 
transaction was meant as a mortgage. 
The Assignment states that "a warranty deed covering the 
property described is executed and delivered herewith in favor 
of [Froerer Corp]." This language is as consistent with the 
defendants' interpretation that the Warranty Deed was given to 
secure future contract payments, as it is with the plaintiffs' 
(i.e., that the deed conveyed fee title). On the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment, the trial court was required to 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendants 
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the defendants' 
interpretation. 
At the very least, the Assignment creates an ambiguity as 
to what Ranch Liquidators' intent was in delivering the Warranty 
Deed to Froerer Corp. As noted above, if the Assignment was 
ambiguous, then the trial court was required to determine the 
parties' intent from evidence other than the Assignment. Big 
Butte Ranch. Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977). The 
only direct evidence before the trial court concerning whether 
or not the parties (Ranch Liquidators and Froerer Corp.) intended 
the Warranty Deed to be a conveyance of title or simply security 
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was the deposition testimony of Frederick Froerer. (See footnote 
6, supra). 
In addition to Mr. Froerer's direct testimony, however, 
there was other circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion 
that the Warranty Deed was given as security and not as a convey-
ance of title. In particular, Ranch Liquidators always retained 
the legal right to convey the Property, which it did by quit-claim 
deed to Mecca Enterprises on March 24, 1982, almost two years 
after it assigned the rights to receive contract payments to 
Froerer Corp. See Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122 (fact that grantor 
had right to sell land to third person indicates the intention 
of parties that title should not pass to the grantee); Powell 
v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1975) (Justice Maughan 
dissenting). Moreover, Froerer Corp. never exercised any owner-
ship rights over the Property or claimed any benefits from the 
Purchase Agreement other than receiving the contract payments. 
When the plaintiffs first requested Froerer Corp. to deliver a 
Warranty Deed, Mr. Froerer immediately informed plaintiffs they 
would have to obtain the Warranty Deed from Ranch Liquidators. 
Clearly, Froerer Corp. never intended to acquire title to the 
Property, and one could certainly infer as much from the documents 
and the parties' conduct. The trial court erred in failing to 
draw that inference, which defendants were entitled to on the 
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plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. See Bowen, 656 P.2d 
at 436. 
Regardless of the foregoing, the plaintiffs ignore the 
Assignment by asserting that Ranch Liquidators' delivery of the 
Warranty Deed was all that was necessary to complete the 
conveyance of title. (See Brief of Respondents, pp. 5-12.) As 
noted in the defendant's initial brief, however, a conveyance 
of real property to be effective requires the delivery of a deed 
with the intent of transferring ownership. Given v. Lambeth, 
10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (1960). There must also be 
an acceptance on the part of the grantee. B-T Ltd. v. Blackman, 
705 P.2d 307, 312 (Wyo. 1985). Without both delivery and accep-
tance, no conveyance is complete. 
It is undisputed that Ranch Liquidators delivered a Warranty 
Deed to Froerer Corp. which Froerer Corp. held pending the full 
payment of the Purchase Agreement.? The mere fact Froerer Corp. 
retained possession of the Warranty Deed does not in and of itself 
acknowledge acceptance of the deed, thereby divesting Ranch Liqui-
dators of ownership. It is undisputed that Froerer Corp. has 
? At page 15 of their Brief plaintiffs argue Froerer 
Corp. 's failure to record the Warranty Deed is fatal to its argu-
ment that the deed was intended as security. Plaintiffs further 
ask the court, "Why should Froerer be rewarded for their 
negligence in failing to record their deed." (Brief of 
Respondents, p. 14.) However, the same may be asked of 
plaintiffs, who could easily have recorded a Notice of Interest, 
thereby putting all prospective purchasers on notice of their 
own interest in the Property. 
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never conveyed or mortgaged the Property, recorded the Warranty 
Deed**, or otherwise exercised any rights of ownership over the 
Property. See Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122; Powell, 541 P.2d at 1831. 
Based upon the facts evaluated in the light most favorable to 
the defendants, a genuine issue of material fact existed con-
cerning whether or not delivery of the Warranty Deed contempor-
aneously with the Assignment, constituted a conveyance of title. 
Defendants contend that it did not constitute a conveyance, and 
for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the trial court 
was obligated to draw the same inference. 
Finally, in an attempt to buttress the trial court's deci-
sion, plaintiffs contend that the Property was impressed with 
a trust in plaintiffs' favor and that Froerer Corp. was under 
an obligation to complete the Purchase Agreement and convey the 
Property to plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth above—that 
Froerer Corp. did not buy the Property, but only the right to 
receive contract payments—this Court does not need to consider 
the issue of whether an equitable trust was created. In every 
case plaintiffs cite in support of their conclusion that an 
equitable trust was created, it was undisputed that the assignee 
had purchased the property. In this case, there remains a factual 
dispute concerning whether Froerer Corp. intended to purchase 
B
 The Warranty Deed was recorded at the request of the 
plaintiff, A. Wayne Winegar, not the defendants. 
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the Property or just contract payments. Based upon that factual 
dispute, defendants were entitled to have all reasonable infer-
ences drawn in their favor, and the trial court erred in con-
cluding otherwise. 
V. THE PLAINTIFFS' RECORDING OF A QUIT-CLAIM 
DEED RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS HAD WAIVED ANY CLAIM 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
At pages 16-17 of their brief, defendants address the trial 
court's error concerning plaintiff's waiver of their claims 
against defendants by recording the Quit-Claim Deed. Other than 
asserting that "their [sic] was no inference of any waiver by 
Winegars in any action they took," plaintiffs fail to identify 
any evidence from the record to support the trial court's apparent 
conclusion that the plaintiffs did not waive any of their claims 
against the defendants. Consequently, a genuine issue of material 
fact continues to exist concerning whether or not plaintiffs' 
acceptance and recording of the Quit-Claim Deed constituted a 
waiver of their claims against defendants. 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PLAIN-
TIFFS RESCISSION BECAUSE ALL OF THE PARTIES 
TO THE CONTRACT WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT, 
AND THOSE BEFORE THE COURT COULD NOT BE RE-
TURNED TO THEIR STATUS QUO. 
The plaintiffs concur with defendants that an essential 
purpose of rescission is to restore the parties to their status 
quo prior to entering into the contract. See Briqqer v. Liddell, 
699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985). The plaintiffs, however, misun-
derstand the concept of rescission by asserting that the only 
parties who need to be returned to the status quo are themselves. 
This understanding is contrary to Utah law. See id. (the fourth 
element necessary for rescission is that it must be possible to 
give rescission without serious prejudice to other party). It 
is incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove that the parties will not 
be put in a worse position than before the transaction occurred. 
Plaintiffs have wholly failed to meet their burden of proof. 
Instead, plaintiffs simply argue that they should not be the 
ones to shoulder the loss based upon Ranch Liquidators' failure 
to convey clear title.9 
y
 Plaintiffs also argue, at page 19 of their Brief, that 
because Froerer Corp. purchased the right to receive contract 
payments at a discounted price, rescission is appropriate. This 
argument is without merit. First, plaintiffs fail to take into 
consideration the time value of money. Generally, anyone pur-
chasing a contract receivable will pay a discounted rate for a 
future income flow. Secondly, plaintiffs inaccurately calculate 
the discount. The payment of $80,000 to Ranch Liquidators repre-
sented a discount of approximately forty-six percent (46%), not 
fifty-four percent (54%) as alleged by plaintiffs. Given the 
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As noted at Points II and IV of their brief, defendants 
neither assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations under the Purchase 
Agreement nor purchased the Property. Plaintiffs' reliance upon 
77 Am. Jur. 2d Rescission § 247 and Miller v. Beck, 72 Or. 140, 
142 P. 603, is misplaced. Those authorities only apply if the 
assignee accepted the deed conveying title. Froerer Corp. did 
not accept the deed or become a party to the Purchase Agreement; 
therefore, the trial court erred in granting rescission since 
Froerer Corp. could not be returned to its status quo. 
VII. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT WERE OTHERWISE CORRECT 
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT ERRED IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE 
FULL AMOUNT OF THEIR CLAIM. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge at page 20 of their brief that Froerer 
Corp. did not receive all the payments under the Purchase 
Agreement. ^ Plaintiffs do not dispute that in an action for 
rescission, a party is only liable for the consideration or bene-
fits received under the contract. See McGraw v. Aylino fin re 
Bell & BeckwithK 54 Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). 
time over which Froerer Corp. was to receive the money and the 
likelihood that it would not receive all of the money, such a 
discount rate was not unreasonable and did not give Froerer Corp. 
any windfall, as the plaintiffs imply. 
10 Plaintiffs again imply that because Froerer Corp. 
purchased the contract payments at a discounted rate, Froerer 
Corp. should bear the financial burden of that discount. 
Plaintiffs, however, fail to consider the time value of money 
and cite absolutely no legal authority in support of their position. 
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For the reasons identified in defendant's initial brief, the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment against defendants 
for the full amount of plaintiffs' claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout their brief, plaintiffs rely exclusively on the 
argument that because Froerer Corp. purchased the Property, they 
assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations to convey clear title 
to them. Plaintiffs, however, ignore the uncontroverted evidence 
that Froerer Corp. never intended to assume Ranch Liquidators' 
obligations under the Purchase Agreement or exercise any rights 
of ownership over the Property. Because Froerer Corp. neither 
assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations nor purchased the Property, 
the defendants did not have an obligation to deliver clear title 
to the plaintiffs. At the very least, Froerer Corp.'s intention 
in taking a Warranty Deed from Ranch Liquidators was a material 
question of fact that precluded summary judgment. The same is 
true with regard to plaintiffs' intentions in recording the Quit-
Claim Deed and whether such recording constituted a waiver on 
the part of the plaintiffs. The trial court further erred in 
granting plaintiffs rescission when defendants could not be 
returned to their status quo. Finally, since the undisputed 
evidence shows that the defendants did not receive all of the 
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plaintiffs' payments, the trial court erred in granting judg-
ment for the full amount of their claims. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision 
should be reversed and this action remanded for further pro-
ceedings . 
DATED this ^ day of March, 1990. 
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